# 1

**CIR will pass – GOP support increasing**

**Leopold, 10-30**-13 [David, Immigration Attorney/Immigration Reform Advocate, past president & past general counsel, American Immigration Lawyers Association, October 30, 2013, “Another Day, Another House Republican Signs On To Comprehensive Immigration Reform”, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-leopold/post_5953_b_4175294.html>, accessed 11-1-13 BLE]

There's no doubt about it. Pressure is building on the House GOP leadership to bring an immigration bill to the floor for a vote -- one that includes a path to earned citizenship for the 11 million undocumented immigrants. Over the weekend Representative Jeff Denham (R-CA) announced that he would team up with the House Democrats in support of H.R. 15, comprehensive immigration reform legislation which is similar to the immigration overhaul passed by the Senate earlier this year. Denham was the first Republican to publicly join hands with the Democrats but he wasn't alone for long. He was quickly followed by Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) on Tuesday. And just this morning a California news outlet reports that a third Republican, Rep. David Valadao (R-CAL), will likely add his name to the list. These Representatives have now joined hands with 185 Democrats to co-sponsor a plan that would give millions of unauthorized immigrants the chance to attain citizenship. And this is likely just the beginning. Immigration advocates -- who are fired up and strongly motivated to get immigration reform done this year -- are circulating a list of 28 target House Republicans who have expressed support in the past for a path to citizenship, some of whose districts include a large number of Hispanic voters. If other Republicans follow Denham's and Ros-Lehtinen's lead it will show the country that they are serious about fixing the immigration problem and are willing to work in a bipartisan way. And all this comes the same week as some 600 conservative leaders from various religious denominations, the agricultural industry, law enforcement, and the business sector have come to Washington to lobby nearly 150 members of Congress for a broad immigration overhaul. These leaders recognize that America's continued economic vitality and future competitiveness require that our immigration policy be brought into the 21st century. There is no question immigration reform can happen by the end of the year. The votes are there in the House. 218 is the magic number it would take to pass an immigration bill on a majority vote. Last month Rep. Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), who serves in the House Democratic leadership, said that there are "at least 200 Democratic votes" in the House for a Senate-like bill. Add the 28 House Republicans who have expressed support for immigration reform and a path to citizenship and real reform can become a reality -- this year.

**Plan is unpopular – bureaucracy causes backlash**

**Dallas Morning News** July **2008** “EDITORIAL: NADBank deserves U.S. funding” ProQuest

Not everyone agrees about the merits of the North American Free Trade Agreement, but it's hard to argue that the North American Development Bank, created under NAFTA, hasn't brought overwhelmingly positive changes to the border region. NADBank's good work needs to continue, and that won't happen if Congress continues to whittle down its funding.¶ Before NAFTA, the border region was an environmental disaster zone. Mexican border towns dumped millions of gallons of raw sewage into area rivers. Tap water was undrinkable. Pollution and industrial waste abounded. It's better now, but much cleanup work remains to be done.¶ Through grants and low-interest loans, NADBank has sparked more than $1.4 billion in public infrastructure projects on both sides of the border. This is not sexy stuff. Much of it involves sewage-treatment plants, landfill sites, water projects and road work. NADBank officials estimate that such projects have halted the dumping of about 300 million gallons per day of sewage into the Rio Grande and other waterways.¶ Washington's skepticism about NADBank has grown in recent years, partly because the bank has been slow to disburse its funds. Bank officials say the backlog was caused by the two-year average lead time needed to study, plan and approve each project before it could be funded. Steps are under way to streamline its processes, bolster accountability and reduce backlogs.¶ As the fervor over NAFTA has died down, so has Capitol Hill's enthusiasm for funding NADBank. Initial U.S. appropriations of nearly $100 million a year have steadily been slashed since NAFTA took effect 14 years ago. The requested 2009 appropriation is only $10 million.¶ Texas Sens. Kay Bailey Hutchison and John Cornyn have been enthusiastic supporters of NADBank in the past. A renewed funding push by them and other border-state legislators would help ensure that the bank's important work stays on track in the future.

**PC is key – Obama push creates a window of opportunity**

Scher, The Week, 10/18/13, Bill, How to make John Boehner cave on immigration, theweek.com/article/index/251361/how-to-make-john-boehner-cave-on-immigration

Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) generally adheres to the unwritten Republican rule that bars him from allowing votes on bills opposed by a majority of Republicans, even if they would win a majority of the full House. But he's caved four times this year, allowing big bills to pass with mainly Democratic support. They include repealing the Bush tax cuts for the wealthiest Americans; providing Hurricane Sandy relief; expanding the Violence Against Women act to better cover immigrants, Native Americans, and LGBT survivors of abuse; and this week's bill raising the debt limit and reopening the federal government. Many presume the Republican House is a black hole sucking President Obama's second-term agenda into oblivion. But the list of Boehner's past retreats offers a glimmer of hope, especially to advocates of immigration reform. Though it has languished in the House, an immigration overhaul passed with bipartisan support in the Senate, and was given a fresh push by Obama in the aftermath of the debt limit deal. The big mystery that immigration advocates need to figure out: What makes Boehner cave? Is there a common thread? Is there a sequence of buttons you can push that forces Boehner to relent? Two of this year's caves happened when Boehner was backed up against hard deadlines: The Jan. 1 fiscal cliff and the Oct. 17 debt limit. Failure to concede meant immediate disaster. Reject the bipartisan compromise on rolling back the Bush tax cuts, get blamed for jacking up taxes on every taxpayer. Reject the Senate's three-month suspension of the debt limit, get blamed for sparking a global depression. Boehner held out until the absolute last minute both times, but he was not willing to risk blowing the deadline. A third involved the response to an emergency: Hurricane Sandy. Conservative groups were determined to block disaster relief because — as with other federal disaster responses — the $51 billion legislative aid package did not include offsetting spending cuts. Lacking Republican votes, Boehner briefly withdrew the bill from consideration, unleashing fury from New York and New Jersey Republicans, including Gov. Chris Christie. While there wasn't a hard deadline to meet, disaster relief was a time-sensitive matter, and the pressure from Christie and his allies was unrelenting. Two weeks after pulling the bill, Boehner put it on the floor, allowing it to pass over the objections of 179 Republicans. The fourth cave occurred in order to further reform and expand a government program: The Violence Against Women Act. The prior version of the law had been expired for over a year, as conservatives in the House resisted the Senate bill in the run-up to the 2012 election. But after Mitt Romney suffered an 18-point gender gap in his loss to Obama, and after the new Senate passed its version again with a strong bipartisan vote, Boehner was unwilling to resist any longer. Two weeks later, the House passed the Senate bill with 138 Republicans opposed. Unfortunately for immigration advocates, there is no prospect of widespread pain if reform isn't passed. There is no immediate emergency, nor threat of economic collapse. But there is a deadline of sorts: The 2014 midterm elections. If we've learned anything about Boehner this month, it's that he's a party man to the bone. He dragged out the shutdown and debt limit drama for weeks, without gaining a single concession, simply so his most unruly and revolutionary-minded members would believe he fought the good fight and stay in the Republican family. What he won is party unity, at least for the time being. What Boehner lost for his Republicans is national respectability. Republican Party approval hit a record low in both the most recent NBC/Wall Street Journal poll and Gallup poll. Here's where immigration advocates have a window of opportunity to appeal to Boehner's party pragmatism. Their pitch: The best way to put this disaster behind them is for Republicans to score a big political victory. You need this. A year after the Republican brand was so bloodied that the Republican National Committee had to commission a formal "autopsy," party approval is the worst it has ever been. You've wasted a year. Now is the time to do something that some voters will actually like. There's reason to hope he could be swayed. In each of the four cases in which he allowed Democrats to carry the day, he put the short-term political needs of the Republican Party over the ideological demands of right-wing activists. Boehner will have to do another round of kabuki. He can't simply swallow the Senate bill in a day. There will have to be a House version that falls short of activists' expectations, followed by tense House-Senate negotiations. Probably like in the most formulaic of movies, and like the fiscal cliff and debt limit deals, there will have to be an "all-is-lost moment" right before we get to the glorious ending. Boehner will need to given the room to do all this again. But he won't do it without a push. A real good push.

**Immigration reform expands skilled labor – spurs relations and economic growth in India**

LA Times, 12 (Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform, 9 November 2012) <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/11/us-immigration-reform-eagerly-awaited-by-source-countries.html>)

"Comprehensive immigration reform will see expansion of skilled labor visas," predicted B. Lindsay Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, Lowell said he expects to see at least a fivefold increase in the number of highly skilled labor visas that would provide "a **significant shot in the arm for India and China**." There is widespread consensus among economists and academics that skilled migration fosters new trade and business relationships between countries and enhances links to the global economy, Lowell said. "Countries like India and China weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and I think they still see the immigration opportunity as a bigger plus than not," he said.

**Key to every existential threat**

Armitage et al., 10

(Richard is the President of Armitage International and former Deputy Secretary of State. R. Nicholas Burns is a Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Richard Fontaine is the President of the Center for New American Security. “Natural Allies: A Blueprint for the Future of U.S.-India Relations,” October, Center for New American Security, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Burns%20-%20Natural%20Allies.pdf>)

A strengthened U.S.-India strategic partnership is thus imperative in this new era. The transformation of U.S. ties with New Delhi over the past 10 years, led by Presidents Clinton and Bush, stands as one of the most significant triumphs of recent American foreign policy. It has also been a bipartisan success. In the last several years alone, the United States and India have completed a landmark civil nuclear cooperation agreement, enhanced military ties, expanded defense trade, increased bilateral trade and investment and deepened their global political cooperation.¶ Many prominent Indians and Americans, however, now fear this rapid expansion of ties has stalled. Past projects remain incomplete, few new ideas have been embraced by both sides, and the forward momentum that characterized recent cooperation has subsided. The Obama administration has taken significant steps to break through this inertia, including with its Strategic Dialogue this spring and President Obama’s planned state visit to India in November 2010. Yet there remains a sense among observers in both countries that this critical relationship is falling short of its promise.¶ We believe it is critical to rejuvenate the U.S.- India partnership and put U.S. relations with India on a more solid foundation. The relationship requires a bold leap forward. The United States should establish a vision for what it seeks in the relationship and give concrete meaning to the phrase “strategic partnership.” A nonpartisan working group of experts met at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) over the past eight months to review the main pillars of the U.S.-India relationship and we articulate here a specific agenda of action.¶ In order to chart a more ambitious U.S.-India strategic partnership, we believe that the United States should commit, publicly and explicitly, to work with India in support of its permanent membership in an enlarged U.N. Security Council; seek a broad expansion of bilateral trade and investment, beginning with a Bilateral Investment Treaty; greatly expand the security relationship and boost defense trade; support Indian membership in key export control organizations, a step toward integrating India into global nonproliferation efforts; and liberalize U.S. export controls, including the removal of Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) subsidiaries from the U.S. Entity List.¶ These and the other actions outlined in this report will require India to make a number of commitments and policy changes, including taking rapid action to fully implement the Civil Nuclear Agreement; raising its caps on foreign investment; reducing barriers to defense and other forms of trade; enhancing its rules for protecting patents and other intellectual property; further harmonizing its export control lists with multilateral regimes; and seeking closer cooperation with the United States and like-minded partners in international organizations, including the United Nations. ¶ The U.S. relationship with India should be rooted in shared interests and values and should not be simply transactional or limited to occasional collaboration. India’s rise to global power is, we believe, in America’s strategic interest. As a result, the United States should not only seek a closer relationship with India, but actively assist its further emergence as a great power.¶ U.S. interests in a closer relationship with India include:¶ • Ensuring a stable Asian and global balance of power.¶ • Strengthening an open global trad[e]ing system.¶ • Protecting and preserving access to the global commons (air, sea, space, and cyber realms).¶ • Countering terrorism and violent extremism.¶ • Ensuring access to secure global energy resources.¶ • Bolstering the international nonproliferation regime.¶ • Promoting democracy and human rights.¶ • Fostering greater stability, security and economic prosperity in South Asia, including in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.¶ A strong U.S.-India strategic partnership will prove indispensable to the region’s continued peace and prosperity. Both India and the United States have a vital interest in maintaining a stable balance of power in Asia. Neither seeks containment of China, but the likelihood of a peaceful Chinese rise increases if it ascends in a region where the great democratic powers are also strong. Growing U.S.-India strategic ties will ensure that Asia will not have a vacuum of power and will make it easier for both Washington and New Delhi to have productive relations with Beijing. In addition, a strengthened relationship with India, a natural democratic partner, will signal that the United States remains committed to a strong and enduring presence in Asia.¶ The need for closer U.S.-India cooperation goes well beyond regional concerns. In light of its rise, India will play an increasingly vital role in addressing virtually **all major global challenges**. Now is the time to transform a series of bilateral achievements into a lasting regional and global partnership.

# 2

**Interpretation**

**"Substantial" most commonly means of considerable value**

Words and Phrases 2

(Volume 40A, p. 458)

D.S.C. 1966. The word “substantial” within Civil Rights Act providing that a place is a public accommodation if a “substantial” portion of food which is served has moved in commerce must be construed in light of its usual and customary meaning, that is, something of real worth and importance; of considerable value; valuable, something worthwhile as distinguished from something without value or merely nominal

**Increase must be a net increase**

Rogers 5 (Judge – New York, et al., Petitioners v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent, NSR Manufacturers Roundtable, et al., Intervenors, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 12378, \*\*; 60 ERC (BNA) 1791, 6/24, Lexis)

[\*\*48]  Statutory Interpretation. [HN16](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1fe428155fdfc9074f3623f0dae9d78a&docnum=14&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=0ebd338d6a7793de8561db53b915effd&focBudTerms=term%20increase&focBudSel=all#clscc16)While the CAA defines a "modification" as any physical or operational change that "increases" emissions, it is silent on how to calculate such "increases" in emissions. [42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4)](http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=8541fbf7a7f5554ca588059b132acd17&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b367%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%203%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=103&_butInline=1&_butinfo=42%20U.S.C.%207411&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=14&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=1f89a0e47b1996a5400e8d865d8da08a). According to government petitioners, the lack of a statutory definition does not render the term "increases" ambiguous, but merely compels the court to give the term its "ordinary meaning." See [Engine Mfrs.Ass'nv.S.Coast AirQualityMgmt.Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 124 S. Ct. 1756, 1761, 158 L. Ed. 2d 529(2004)](http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=8541fbf7a7f5554ca588059b132acd17&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b367%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%203%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=104&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b541%20U.S.%20246%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=14&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=48f016ea3eabfdb898b67b348b11662c); [Bluewater Network, 370 F.3d at 13](http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=8541fbf7a7f5554ca588059b132acd17&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b367%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%203%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=105&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b370%20F.3d%201%2cat%2013%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=14&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=78fdfe9d48c7b91d7659b90c0198707e); [Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Glickman, 342 U.S. App. D.C. 7, 215 F.3d 7, 10 [\*23]  (D.C. Cir. 2000)](http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=8541fbf7a7f5554ca588059b132acd17&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b367%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%203%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=106&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b342%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%207%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=14&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=fb18ff0b92931ac00621d88dae997e67). Relying on two "real world" analogies, government petitioners contend that the ordinary meaning of "increases" requires the baseline to be calculated from a period immediately preceding the change. They maintain, for example, that in determining whether a high-pressure weather system "increases" the local temperature, the relevant baseline is the temperature immediately preceding the arrival of the weather system, not the temperature five or ten years ago. Similarly,  [\*\*49]  in determining whether a new engine "increases" the value of a car, the relevant baseline is the value of the car immediately preceding the replacement of the engine, not the value of the car five or ten years ago when the engine was in perfect condition.

**‘Its’ is a possessive pronoun showing ownership**

**Glossary of English Grammar Terms, 2005**

(http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership.

EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

**Violation – the NADBank already exists and cooperates with Mexico, and their Hereford evidence indicates they don’t increase the federal government’s funding – the aff is not a substantial increase, nor is it an increase of USfg engagement**

**Vote neg**

**a. Predictable Limits – allowing affs that don’t substantially increase economic engagement explodes the topic – anything done in relation to the countries are topical**

**b. Ground – we lose links to all DAs because nothing happens as a result**

# 3

**Engagement strategies rely on a Eurocentric understanding of international relations**

Young, 4/20/13 (Kevin, 4/20/13, “The Good, the Bad, and the Benevolent Interventionist: U.S. Press and Intellectual Distortions of the Latin American Left” <http://www.nytexaminer.com/2013/04/the-good-the-bad-and-the-benevolent-interventionist-u-s-press-and-intellectual-distortions-of-the-latin-american-left/>, date accessed 7/5/13 IGM)

The good-left/bad-left thesis may seem more enlightened and progressive than classic racist or imperialist rhetoric in that it does not lump all Latin Americans together, but in fact the clever colonizer has always distinguished between “good” and “bad” members of the subordinate group. When Columbus sailed through the Caribbean in the 1490s, he contrasted the peaceful Arawaks of Cuba to the aggressive, allegedly cannibalistic Caribs to the southeast (Hulme, 1994: 169–171, 190). European and U.S. imperialists, as well as Latin American elites, employed similar discursive strategies over the following centuries.2 In the early twentieth century, both the jingoists led by Theodore Roosevelt and the Wilsonian “idealists” contrasted the unruly children of Central America and the Caribbean with the more responsible leaders in the bigger Latin American countries. Woodrow Wilson and his appointees pledged to replace the “naughty children” of Latin America with “good men,” whom they would “teach the South American republics to elect” (Schoultz, 1998: 244, 272, 192–197; Kenworthy, 1995: 30; cf. Johnson, 1980: 209, 217; Black, 1988). Later, following the 1959 Cuban Revolution, U.S. policy came to focus on assisting the good Latins while isolating, and often exterminating, the bad; many of the tropes used to characterize Hugo Chávez in the past decade have clear precedents in government and press depictions of Fidel Castro starting four decades earlier (Platt et al., 1987; Johnson, 1980: 113, 241; Landau, 2006; Chomsky, 2008). Similar binary depictions have long characterized Orientalist discourse toward Asian and African peoples, particularly Muslims (Mamdani, 2004).¶ Historically these distinctions have helped to justify outside intervention in the name of “protecting” the good from the bad, and today the “benevolent interventionist” frame often accompanies the good-left/bad-left frame. Just as Columbus was protecting the peaceful Arawaks from the savage Caribs, the U.S. government promotes democracy through its relations with the good left, protecting those countries from the bad left. By definition, all such interventions are undertaken with noble and humanitarian intent. This paternalistic discourse has remained remarkably consistent throughout the history of imperialism and internal colonialism, albeit with new rhetorical demons and pretexts in each successive epoch: corruption, endemic revolts, and European intervention in Wilson’s day, Communism during the Cold War, and autocrats, populists, terrorists, and drug cartels since the Soviet Union’s collapse. The main demons are typically external to Latin America—often associated with the “Old World,” the Soviet Union, or, more recently, various Asian and Middle Eastern countries—but there are usually internal demons, too (Kenworthy, 1995: 18–37).¶ Press coverage of right-wing coups against Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez in 2002 and Honduras’s Manuel Zelaya in 2009, and of the U.S. government’s role in and after those coups, offers stark examples of media support (open or tacit) for recent U.S. interventionism. In both cases the U.S. response was accompanied by reports and opinion pieces about legitimate U.S. security concerns and honest regard for democracy. In addition to praising U.S. motives, news reports, opinion pieces, and intellectual commentary often implied that Latin Americans both needed and wanted U.S. intervention.

**Failure to confront our flawed form of knowledge production inevitably leads to conflict - Excluding other types of thought through universalizing truth claims makes resistance manifest in violent ways**

Barkawi, and Laffey, 6 (Tarak University of Cambridge Center of International Studies senior lecturer, and Mark, University of London politics and international relations professor 2006, “The postcolonial moment in security studies”, Review of International Studies, vol. 32, pg. 331-333, <https://umdrive.memphis.edu/rblanton/public/POLS_7508_Fall_2012/barwaki_postcolonial_RIS_2006.pdf>, accessed 7/12/13, JZ)

The rootedness of the current conflict in centuries of often violent interaction between North and South is difficult to see due to security studies’ reliance on histories and geographies which reproduce Eurocentric conceptions of world politics. This problem is not peculiar to security studies. According to Barry Buzan and Richard Little, ‘there is no doubt that I[nternational] R[elations] has been studied from a very Eurocentric perspective . . .’10 Eurocentrism is a complex idea but at its core is the assumption of European centrality in the human past and present.11 On this view, Europe is conceived as separate and distinct from the rest of the world, as self-contained and self-generating. Analysis of the past, present and future of world politics is carried out in terms – conceptual and empirical, political and normative – that take for granted this centrality and separation.12 Neither the content – social, political, economic and cultural – nor the geographical location of ‘Europe’ are fixed. Eurocentrism is about both a real and an imagined Europe. Over time, as Martin Lewis and Kären Wigen demonstrate, the location of Europe shifts, expands and contracts, eventually crossing the Atlantic and the Pacific and becoming synonymous with the ‘West’.13 Today, the ‘West’ is centred on the Anglophone US – a former European settler colony – and incorporates Western Europe, North America, Japan and the British settler societies of Oceania. There are few better examples of Eurocentrism than the notion that the end-point of development and modernisation is defined by the contemporary West.¶ The Eurocentrism of conventional security studies takes different forms across the theoretic perspectives that constitute the field. For realists, a ‘general theory of international politics is necessarily based on the great powers’.14 In modern history those powers are overwhelmingly located in Europe and the West. Eurocentrism is therefore intrinsic to the way in which realism is constructed in International Relations (IR).15 The great antagonists of realism, the liberals, seek to regulate conflict and alleviate its humanitarian consequences through a turn to domestic and international institutions and norms. International institutions such as the League of Nations, the United Nations and the nuclear non-proliferation regime are largely the product of interstate diplomacy dominated by Western great powers.16 Moreover, liberal democracy and the ethical principles that inform liberal opinion are the product of purportedly European histories and intellectual trajectories, most prominently those associated with the Enlightenments.17 Many constructivists share similar commitments as in attempts to make sense of international order in Hobbesian, Lockean or Kantian terms.18 Recent efforts to move beyond the realist-liberal debate, such as Critical Security Studies, draw their core concept of human emancipation from these same intellectual traditions.19 Each of these traditions, as postcolonial thinkers take pains to point out, rest on profoundly Eurocentric and racist assumptions.20 As Immanuel Kant, a figure dear to both liberal and critical scholars, observed, ‘Humanity achieves its greatest perfection with the White race’.21¶ Eurocentrism generates a variety of difficulties for the analysis of security relations, and world politics more generally.22 Two in particular motivate our argument here. First, as we have noted, questions of war and peace raised by great power competition are foundational for security thought and practice. As a result, security studies provides few categories for making sense of the historical experiences of the weak and the powerless who comprise most of the world’s population. By default, these experiences are conceived in categories derived from great power politics in the North. Consequently, national liberation struggles in the post-World War II era were thought of in Cold War terms by many US policymakers and defence intellectuals.23 Today, this categorical error is repeated in a new form. Armed resistance to Northern domination of the international system is subsumed largely under the category of ‘terrorism’. In contemporary usage this term legitimates state power and delegitimates the use of force by non-state actors.24 It assumes in advance that ‘terrorist’ acts are always illegitimate and unjustified. Understanding why the weak resist and the forms their resistance takes is not aided by calling them names.¶ Second, and related, to the extent it addresses them at all, a Eurocentric security studies regards the weak and the powerless as marginal or derivative elements of world politics, as at best the site of liberal good intentions or at worst a potential source of threats.25 Missed are the multiple and integral relations between the weak and the strong. Across diverse fields of social inquiry, it is taken for granted that the weak and the strong must be placed in a common analytic frame, as together constitutive of events, processes and structures.26 In contrast IR, and security studies in particular, mainly proceed by attending to the powerful only. As Stanley Hoffmann notes, IR takes an ‘Athenian’ perspective on the world.27 For realism, with its focus on great powers, one-sided analysis of this kind is foundational. For liberal and some critical approaches to security studies, the weak are of interest but primarily as bearers of rights and objects of emancipation, that is, for their normative value in Western political theoretic terms.28 Failing to study the weak and the strong together, as jointly responsible for making history, hamstrings IR and security studies’ ability to make sense of world politics generally and North-South relations in particular.¶ That the weak play an integral role in shaping world politics is harder to deny when a Southern resistance movement strikes at the heart of Northern power. In the wake of those attacks, a series of developments transformed international and domestic politics around the world in diverse ways. Wars are being fought; alliance relations reconfigured; security forces redeployed; borders reworked; civil liberties curtailed; departments of state created; and identities remade. Understanding security relations now requires that we discard Eurocentric assumptions about the world and how it works.

**Our alternative is to reject the aff. We need to reconceptualize our relationship to power and the hierarchies of foreign relations.**

Chandra, 13 (Uday, Max Planck institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity, Department of Religious Diversity, Post-Doc, PhD Yale, Aug 2013, Yale University, “The Case for a Postcolonial Approach to the Study of Politics”, http://academia.edu/2364123/The\_Case\_for\_a\_Postcolonial\_Approach\_to\_the\_Study\_of\_Politics, Accessed 7/12/13, NC)

¶ Towards a Postcolonial Approach to Political Science¶ The preceding section demonstrated how American political science research on the postcolonial world reproduces older colonial stereotypes and theories. In this section, I chart the path towards a postcolonial approach to the study of politics. Such an approach, I argue, calls for a sustained engagement with specific non-Western contexts as well as an openness to anthropological, historical, and area studies knowledge about them. A postcolonial approach can take many forms, but I highlight three possibilities here: ¶ (1) critiques of existing Eurocentric theories of comparative politics; ¶ (2) bottom-up ethnographic and historical understandings of politics in particular contexts; ¶ (3) re-evaluating key political concepts such as the state, democracy, nationalism, and war in the light of different non-Western experiences. ¶ The first of these postcolonial approaches expands on the previous section. The aim is to examine and deconstruct mainstream political science theories about the postcolonial world by unveiling their overt biases and blindspots. These biases and blindspots, it needs to be demonstrated, are not arbitrary, but tied to distinctly Eurocentric visions of politics and society. Such visions implicitly or explicitly privilege Western experiences over non-Western ones, deny any measure of coevalness, and recast the postcolonial as backward or underdeveloped. For instance, the study of democracy exhibited clear strains of Eurocentrism insofar as they assumed a priori that modern West is the “natural” home of democracy and the postcolonial world throws up inchoate versions of modern Western democracy. Similarly, the contemporary study of civil wars is crippled by its Eurocentric view of postcolonial conflicts as a function of structural inadequacies such as weak states, economic backwardness, and primordial ethnic divisions. ¶ To overcome these Eurocentric views, a second kind of postcolonial approach is warranted. The aim of this approach is to offer alternatives to mainstream political science theories via in-depth, bottom-up empirical understandings of politics in postcolonial settings. Interpretive research relying on ethnographic and/or historical methods is particularly well-suited to achieve this aim. Even statistical studies that are sensitive to contextual realities in the postcolonial world can do so. The “science” underlying political science should itself be reconsidered and revised beyond its current neo-positivist confines. Investigations of vernacular practices and experiences of democracy in countries as diverse as Mexico, Nigeria, Yemen, and India are a part of this approach. So, too, are meaning-centered explanations of why ordinary men and women in postcolonial settings participate in armed social conflicts and other risky forms of collective action. ¶ A third kind of postcolonial approach, complementing the first two, seeks to rethink and redefine key political concepts by ridding them of their existing Eurocentric biases. The interpenetration of power and knowledge arguably leaves its deepest imprint on concepts, which are vital building blocks for social-scientific theories. What “democracy” means in India or Mexico is likely to be quite different from the United States or Canada. Difference does not, however, imply that one can be judged as inherently superior to another. The European or American experience of democracy cannot, in particular, be universalized into an abstract general model of democracy. Likewise, the notion of “civil wars” conceals a latent conviction that only strong states that can conquer their peripheries can establish a legitimate monopoly of violence within a certain territory. Whether in the Americas, Asia or Africa, this conviction is inseparable from the violence wrought by European colonialism on subject populations in its quest for political order. ¶ Taken together, these postcolonial approaches to the study of politics call for “provincializing Europe,” as Dipesh Chakrabarty has argued recently, so that we can avoid treating European experiences as universals. This task is simultaneously theoretical and empirical as well as intellectual and practical. As such, it supplements ongoing efforts within the United States and Europe to produce critical scholarship on racial, gender, and sexual minorities, inequalities of class and status, and the interpenetration of power and knowledge in mainstream political science. To sum up, a postcolonial approach to politics is a radical endeavor that seeks to challenge mainstream knowledge on non-Western politics and society via sustained engagements with them.

# 4

**CP Text: Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California should finance transportation infrastructure projects with Mexico, including through a bi-national bond financing mechanism.**

**Border States solve – corridor planning**

Shapleigh, 8 [10/08, Eliot, Texas Senator, “Texas Borderlands 2009 The State of Border Transportation and Security,” http://shapleigh.org/system/reporting\_document/file/238/81st\_Transportation\_Chapter.pdf, date accessed: 07/12/13, LV]

Key U.S.-Mexico border ports-of-entry are located on international trade corridors¶ linking Mexico, the United States, and Canada. The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient ¶ Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) emphasizes continued federal ¶ interest in identifying and promoting key international highway trade corridors in the United ¶ States. U.S.-Mexico border states should continue to expand efforts at border corridor planning ¶ coordination. Border corridor plans should recognize the role of border ports-of-entry on selected ¶ international corridors and ensure that their contributions to transportation effectiveness and ¶ efficiency is explicitly recognized. In the future, trade corridors may qualify for a variety of ¶ federal transportation funding, and the border region needs to be clearly recognized as part of the ¶ U.S. corridor program. By clearly stating the case for new trade corridor investment along the ¶ Border, we will establish the foundation to support future requests for federal funding for the ¶ Border Region.¶ In addition, a corridor analysis of trade flow can produce substantial benefits for both ¶ planners and users. Corridor planning considers the overall efficiency of a transportation¶ corridor by analyzing how efficiencies along the corridor benefit the corridor overall. Evidence ¶ supports the separation of trade flows and transportation flows because the two can differ so ¶ extensively. Enhancing our understanding of how corridors work will lead to a better use of ¶ resources, while a regional analysis of transportation flows will make a stronger case for federal ¶ support. Finally, the bi-national nature of U.S.-Mexico will allow us to synchronize investment ¶ plans with the Mexican Ministry of Transport.

# 1nc Manufacturing

**No impact to heg —**

**A. Latent power**

Wohlforth 7 (Olin Fellow in International Security Studies at Yale University William, Harvard International Review, “The Rules of Power Analysis,” Vol. 29, Spring, <http://hir.harvard.edu/index.php?page=article&id=1611&p=3>, accessed 6/27 TR)

Rule No. 4: Consider Latent Power US military forces are stretched thin, its budget and trade deficits are high, and the country continues to finance its profligate ways by borrowing from abroad—notably from the Chinese government. These developments have prompted many analysts to warn that the United States suffers from “imperial overstretch.” And if US power is overstretched now, the argument goes, unipolarity can hardly be sustainable for long. The problem with this argument is that it fails to distinguish between actual and latent power. One must be careful to take into account both the level of resources that can be mobilized and the degree to which a government actually tries to mobilize them. And how much a government asks of its public is partly a function of the severity of the challenges that it faces. Indeed, one can never know for sure what a state is capable of until it has been seriously challenged. Yale historian Paul Kennedy coined the term “imperial overstretch” to describe the situation in which a state’s actual and latent capabilities cannot possibly match its foreign policy commitments. This situation should be contrasted with what might be termed “self-inflicted overstretch”—a situation in which a state lacks the sufficient resources to meet its current foreign policy commitments in the short term, but has untapped latent power and readily available policy choices that it can use to draw on this power. This is arguably the situation that the United States is in today. But the US government has not attempted to extract more resources from its population to meet its foreign policy commitments. Instead, it has moved strongly in the opposite direction by slashing personal and corporate tax rates. Although it is fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and claims to be fighting a global “war” on terrorism, the United States is not acting like a country under intense international pressure. Aside from the volunteer servicemen and women and their families, US citizens have not been asked to make sacrifices for the sake of national prosperity and security. The country could clearly devote a greater proportion of its economy to military spending: today it spends only about 4 percent of its GDP on the military, as compared to 7 to 14 percent during the peak years of the Cold War. It could also spend its military budget more efficiently, shifting resources from expensive weapons systems to boots on the ground. Even more radically, it could reinstitute military conscription, shifting resources from pay and benefits to training and equipping more soldiers. On the economic front, it could raise taxes in a number of ways, notably on fossil fuels, to put its fiscal house back in order. No one knows for sure what would happen if a US president undertook such drastic measures, but there is nothing in economics, political science, or history to suggest that such policies would be any less likely to succeed than China is to continue to grow rapidly for decades. Most of those who study US politics would argue that the likelihood and potential success of such power-generating policies depends on public support, which is a function of the public’s perception of a threat. And as unnerving as terrorism is, there is nothing like the threat of another hostile power rising up in opposition to the United States for mobilizing public support. With latent power in the picture, it becomes clear that unipolarity might have more built-in self-reinforcing mechanisms than many analysts realize. It is often noted that the rise of a peer competitor to the United States might be thwarted by the counterbalancing actions of neighboring powers. For example, China’s rise might push India and Japan closer to the United States—indeed, this has already happened to some extent. There is also the strong possibility that a peer rival that comes to be seen as a threat would create strong incentives for the United States to end its self-inflicted overstretch and tap potentially large wellsprings of latent power.

**b. economic stability**

Preble 10 (Christopher, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute August 2010 “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?” <http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/>)

Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions. But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab.

**c. no specific scenarios**

Fettweis 11 (Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO, CMR)

**Assertions that without the combination of U.S. capabilities, presence and commitments instability would return** to Europe and the Pacific Rim **are** usually **rendered in** rather **vague language.** If the United States were to decrease its commitments abroad, argued Robert Art, “**the world will become a more dangerous** place and, sooner or later, that will redound to America’s detriment.”53 **From** **where would this danger arise**? **Who precisely would do the fighting, and over what issues**? Without the United States, would Europe really descend into Hobbesian anarchy? Would the Japanese attack mainland China again, to see if they could fare better this time around? Would the Germans and French have another go at it? In other words, **where exactly is hegemony is keeping the peace?** With one exception, these questions are rarely addressed. That exception is in the Pacific Rim. Some analysts fear that a de facto surrender of U.S. hegemony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become “the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture,” and that Beijing would come to “dominate science and technology, in all its forms” to the extent that soon the world would witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but “plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future.”54 Indeed China is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it still is only about 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. **The much-ballyhooed, decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to** somewhere between **one-tenth** and one-fifth of **the U.S. level. It is hardly clear that a restrained United States would invite Chinese regional, must less global, political expansion**. Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where war is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, **the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire**. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less severe than ever before. Believers in the pacifying power of hegemony ought to keep in mind a rather basic tenet: When it comes to policymaking, **specific threats are more significant than vague, unnamed dangers**. **Without specific risks, it is just as plausible to interpret U.S. presence as redundant, as overseeing a peace that has already arrived. Strategy should not be based upon vague images emerging from the dark reaches of the neoconservative imagination**. Overestimating Our Importance One of the most **basic** insights of cognitive **psychology provides the final reason to doubt** the power of **hegemonic stability: Rarely are our actions as consequential** upon their behavior **as we perceive them to be.** A great deal of experimental evidence exists to support the notion that people (and therefore **states**) tend to **overrate** **the degree to which their behavior is responsible for the actions of others**. Robert Jervis has argued that two processes account for this overestimation, both of which would seem to be especially relevant in the U.S. case.55 First, believing that we are responsible for their actions gratifies our national ego (which is not small to begin with; the United States is exceptional in its exceptionalism). The hubris of the United States, long appreciated and noted, has only grown with the collapse of the Soviet Union.56 U.S. policymakers famously have comparatively little knowledge of—or interest in—events that occur outside of their own borders. **If there is any state vulnerable to the overestimation of its importance due to the fundamental misunderstanding of the motivation of others, it would** have to **be the U**nited **S**tates. Second, **policymakers** in the United States **are far more familiar with our actions** than they are with the decision-making processes of our allies. Try as we might, it is not possible to fully understand the threats, challenges, and opportunities that our allies see from their perspective. The European great powers have domestic politics as complex as ours, and they also have competent, capable strategists to chart their way forward. They react to many international forces, of which U.S. behavior is only one. **Therefore**, for any actor trying to make sense of the action of others, Jervis notes, “in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, **the most obvious and parsimonious explanation is that he was responsible.”57 It is natural, therefore, for U.S. policymakers** and strategists **to believe** that the **behavior of** our **allies (and rivals) is shaped** largely **by** what **Washington** does. Presumably Americans are at least as susceptible to the overestimation of their ability as any other people, and perhaps more so. At the very least, political psychologists tell us, **we are** probably **not as important to them as we think. The importance of U.S. hegemony in contributing to international stability is** therefore almost certainly **overrated**. In the end, one can never be sure why our major allies have not gone to, and do not even plan for, war. Like deterrence, the **hegemonic stability theory rests on faith; it can only be falsified, never proven**. It does not seem likely, however, that hegemony could fully account for twenty years of strategic decisions made in allied capitals if the international system were not already a remarkably peaceful place. Perhaps these states have no intention of fighting one another to begin with, and our commitments are redundant. European great powers may well have chosen strategic restraint because they feel that their security is all but assured, with or without the United States.

**NSA surveillance kills credibility**

Fox News Latino 10/29 ("Obama Administration Mulls Over Ending Spying On Allied Nations In Wake Of NSA Scandal," 10/29/13, latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2013/10/29/obama-administration-mulls-over-ending-spying-on-allied-nations-in-wake-nsa/, *slim*\_)

While it began with reports of spying on the administration of Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, the National Security Agency spying scandal has picked up steam amid the most recent disclosure that the NSA was monitoring the communications of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Faced with a flood of revelations about U.S. spying practices, the White House is considering ending its eavesdropping on friendly foreign leaders, a senior administration official said. A final decision has not been made and the move is still under review, the official said. But the fact that it is even being considered underscores the level of concern within the administration over the possible damage from the months-long spying scandal. On Monday, Sen. Dianne Feinstein, chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, called for a "total review of all intelligence programs" following the Merkel allegations. In a statement, the California Democrat said the White House had informed her that "collection on our allies will not continue." The administration official said that statement was not accurate, but added that some unspecified changes already had been made and more were being considered, including terminating the collection of communications from friendly heads of state. The official was not authorized to discuss the review by name and insisted on anonymity. Reports based on new leaks from former NSA systems analyst Edward Snowden indicate that the NSA listened to Merkel and 34 other foreign leaders. "With respect to NSA collection of intelligence on leaders of U.S. allies — including France, Spain, Mexico and Germany — let me state unequivocally: I am totally opposed," Feinstein said. She added that the U.S. should not be "collecting phone calls or emails of friendly presidents and prime ministers" unless in an emergency with approval of the president. In response to the revelations, German officials said Monday that the U.S. could lose access to an important law enforcement tool used to track terrorist money flows. Other longtime allies have also expressed their displeasure about the U.S. spying on their leaders. As possible leverage, German authorities cited last week's non-binding resolution by the European Parliament to suspend a post-9/11 agreement allowing the Americans access to bank transfer data to track the flow of terrorist money. A top German official said Monday she believed the Americans were using the information to gather economic intelligence apart from terrorism and said the agreement, known as the SWIFT agreement, should be suspended. European Union officials who are in Washington to meet with lawmakers ahead of White House talks said U.S. surveillance of their people could affect negotiations over a U.S.-Europe trade agreement. They said European privacy must be better protected. Many officials in Germany and other European governments have made clear, however, that they don't favor suspending the U.S.-EU trade talks which began last summer because both sides stand to gain so much through the proposed deal, especially against competition from China and other emerging markets. As tensions with European allies escalate, the top U.S. intelligence official declassified dozens of pages of top-secret documents in an apparent bid to show the NSA was acting legally when it gathered millions of Americans' phone records.

**Their econ studies fail – conflict literature bias**

**Bazzi and Blattman, 11** (Samuel Bazzi (Department of Economics at University of California San Diego) and Christopher Blattman (assistant professor of political science and economics at Yale University) November 2011 “Economic Shocks and Conflict: The (Absence of?) Evidence from Commodity Prices” <http://www.chrisblattman.com/documents/research/2011.EconomicShocksAndConflict.pdf?9d7bd4>)

VI. Discussion and conclusions A. Implications for our theories of political instability and conflict The state is not a prize?—Warlord politics and the state prize logic lie at the center of the most influential models of conflict, state development, and political transitions in economics and political science. Yet we see no evidence for this idea in economic shocks, even when looking at the friendliest cases: fragile and unconstrained states dominated by extractive commodity revenues. Indeed, we see the opposite correlation: if anything, higher rents from commodity prices weakly 22 lower the risk and length of conflict. Perhaps shocks are the wrong test. Stocks of resources could matter more than price shocks (especially if shocks are transitory). But combined with emerging evidence that war onset is no more likely even with rapid increases in known oil reserves (Humphreys 2005; Cotet and Tsui 2010) we regard the state prize logic of war with skepticism.17 Our main political economy models may need a new engine. Naturally, an absence of evidence cannot be taken for evidence of absence. Many of our conflict onset and ending results include sizeable positive and negative effects.18 Even so, commodity price shocks are highly influential in income and should provide a rich source of identifiable variation in instability. It is difficult to find a better-measured, more abundant, and plausibly exogenous independent variable than price volatility. Moreover, other time-varying variables, like rainfall and foreign aid, exhibit robust correlations with conflict in spite of suffering similar empirical drawbacks and generally smaller sample sizes (Miguel et al. 2004; Nielsen et al. 2011). Thus we take the absence of evidence seriously. Do resource revenues drive state capacity?—State prize models assume that rising revenues raise the value of the capturing the state, but have ignored or downplayed the effect of revenues on self-defense. We saw that a growing empirical political science literature takes just such a revenue-centered approach, illustrating that resource boom times permit both payoffs and repression, and that stocks of lootable or extractive resources can bring political order and stability. This countervailing effect is most likely with transitory shocks, as current revenues are affected while long term value is not. Our findings are partly consistent with this state capacity effect. For example, conflict intensity is most sensitive to changes in the extractive commodities rather than the annual agricultural crops that affect household incomes more directly. The relationship only holds for conflict intensity, however, and is somewhat fragile. We do not see a large, consistent or robust decline in conflict or coup risk when prices fall. A reasonable interpretation is that the state prize and state capacity effects are either small or tend to cancel one another out. Opportunity cost: Victory by default?—Finally, the inverse relationship between prices and war intensity is consistent with opportunity cost accounts, but not exclusively so. As we noted above, the relationship between intensity and extractive commodity prices is more consistent with the state capacity view. Moreover, we shouldn’t mistake an inverse relation between individual aggression and incomes as evidence for the opportunity cost mechanism. The same correlation is consistent with psychological theories of stress and aggression (Berkowitz 1993) and sociological and political theories of relative deprivation and anomie (Merton 1938; Gurr 1971). Microempirical work will be needed to distinguish between these mechanisms. Other reasons for a null result.—Ultimately, however, the fact that commodity price shocks have no discernible effect on new conflict onsets, but some effect on ongoing conflict, suggests that political stability might be less sensitive to income or temporary shocks than generally believed. One possibility is that successfully mounting an insurgency is no easy task. It comes with considerable risk, costs, and coordination challenges. Another possibility is that the counterfactual is still conflict onset. In poor and fragile nations, income shocks of one type or another are ubiquitous. If a nation is so fragile that a change in prices could lead to war, then other shocks may trigger war even in the absence of a price shock. The same argument has been made in debunking the myth that price shocks led to fiscal collapse and low growth in developing nations in the 1980s.19 B. A general problem of publication bias? More generally, these findings should heighten our concern with publication bias in the conflict literature. Our results run against a number of published results on commodity shocks and conflict, mainly because of select samples, misspecification, and sensitivity to model assumptions, and, most importantly, alternative measures of instability. Across the social and hard sciences, there is a concern that the majority of published research findings are false (e.g. Gerber et al. 2001). Ioannidis (2005) demonstrates that a published finding is less likely to be true when there is a greater number and lesser pre-selection of tested relationships; there is greater flexibility in designs, definitions, outcomes, and models; and when more teams are involved in the chase of statistical significance. The cross-national study of conflict is an extreme case of all these. Most worryingly, almost no paper looks at alternative dependent variables or publishes systematic robustness checks. Hegre and Sambanis (2006) have shown that the majority of published conflict results are fragile, though they focus on timeinvariant regressors and not the time-varying shocks that have grown in popularity. We are also concerned there is a “file drawer problem” (Rosenthal 1979). Consider this decision rule: scholars that discover robust results that fit a theoretical intuition pursue the results; but if results are not robust the scholar (or referees) worry about problems with the data or empirical strategy, and identify additional work to be done. If further analysis produces a robust result, it is published. If not, back to the file drawer. In the aggregate, the consequences are dire: a lower threshold of evidence for initially significant results than ambiguous ones.20

**Even if studies are true, decline’s empirically denied**

Apps 10 6/8, \*Peter Apps: Political Risk Correspondent and writer for Reuters, “Crisis fuels unrest, crime, but war risk eases,” http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/06/08/idINIndia-49123220100608, AJ

(Reuters) The global financial crisis has made the world less peaceful by fuelling crime and civil unrest, a worldwide study showed on Tuesday, but the **risk of outright armed conflict appears to be falling**. Perhaps as a result of the more cash-strapped times, defence spending as a percentage of gross domestic product was down to its lowest in four years with countries also **showing generally better relations** with their neighbours. "In most areas of the world, war risk seems to be declining," he said. "That is very important." A 25 percent reduction in violence would save about $1.7 trillion a year, **enough to pay off Greece's debt**, fund the United Nations millennium development goals and pay for the European Union to reach its 2020 climate and carbon targets. The struggling euro zone economies of Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain showed a particular rise in unrest risks, while Africa and the Middle East were the only two regions to have become safer since the survey began in 2007. Africa had seen a **drastic fall in the number of armed conflicts and an improvement in relations** between neighbours, he said, overshadowing the impact of greater crime. Better ratings for the Middle East and North Africa came primarily from improving relations between nations.

**Economic security is a form of colonization that produces a self-fulfilling prophecy**

Lipschutz 95, Professor of Politics at UC Santa Cruz, 1995, On Security, pg 15-16

Consider, then, the consequences of the intersection of security policy and economics during and after the Cold War. **In order to establish a “secure” global system, the U**nited **S**tates **advocated**, and put into place, a global system of **economic liberalism**. It then underwrote, with dollars and other aid, the growth of this system.43 One consequence, of this project was the globalizations of a particular mode of production and accumulation, which relied on the re-creation, throughout the world, of the domestic political and economic environment and preferences of the United States. That such a project cannot be accomplished under conditions of really-existing capitalism is not important: **the idea was** that **economic** and political **liberalism would reproduce the American self around the world**.44 **This would make the world** safe and **secure for the U**ntited **S**tates inasmuch **as it would all be the self**, so to speak. The joker in this particular deck was that efforts to reproduce some version of American society abroad, in order **to make the world** more **secure** for Americans, **came to threaten the cultures and societies** of the countries **being transformed**, making their citizens less secure. **The process thereby transformed them into the very enemies we feared so greatly**. In Iran, for example, the Shah’s efforts to create a Westernized society engendered so much domestic resistance that not only did it bring down his empire but so, for a time, seemed to pose a mortal threat to the American Empire based on Persian Gulf oil. Islamic “fundamentalism,” now characterized by some as the enemy that will replace Communism, seems to be U.S. policymakers’ worst nightmares made real,45 although without the United States to interfere in the Middle East and elsewhere, the Islamic movements might never have acquired the domestic power they now have in those countries and regions that seem so essential to American “security.” The ways in which the framing of threats is influenced by a changing global economy is seen nowhere more clearly than in recent debates over competitiveness and “economic security.” What does it mean to be competitive? Is a national industrial policy consistent with global economic liberalization? How is the security compenent of this issue socially constructed? Beverly Crawford (Chapter 6: “Hawks, Doves, but no Owls: The New Security Dilemma Under International Economic Interdependence”) shows how strategic economic interdependence – a consequence of the growing liberalization of the global economic sytem, the increasing availability of advanced technologies through commercial markets, and the ever-increasing velocity of the product cycle – undermines the ability

**econ resilient – job numbers**

Godhwani 8/15 (Gautam, CEO of Simplyhired.com and Huffington Post Contributor—cites polls and government reports, Signs of Resilience in our Economy, 8/15/12; LA)

These days, it's rare to see a day pass without hearing some sort of negative commentary or sentiment towards today's economy. But, there's one characteristic about our nation's economy that folks tend to overlook -- resiliency. By definition, resiliency is "an ability to recover from or adjust easily to misfortune or change." Today's economy is proving to be rather resilient - the growth is slow, but we continue to head in the right direction, even at a time when economies across the globe continue to struggle. With the prospect of a modest, steady recovery in our future, employer confidence continues to rise. In Simply Hired's monthly [U.S. Employment Outlook](http://www.simplyhired.com/press/archives/2012/08/job_openings_in.php), we've seen job openings increase in each of the last three months. Nationwide job openings increased 4.5 percent in July, while June saw a 9.2 percent jump and May had a 3.3 percent increase. In addition, every one of the top 50 metropolitan areas experienced growth in job openings for the second month in a row. Nationwide, we're looking at a total of 4.3 million job openings right now. That's nearly a 10 percent increase from last year. Sounds promising, right? This month's Labor Department job report was also more positive than expected, showing that over the past month, the U.S. economy created jobs at the fastest pace since February of this year. Employers added a total of 163,000 jobs in July. And after disappointing reports in May and June, this change of direction demonstrates strength and resilience in our economy. We've seen this again and again in our history, and it has brought us out of past recessions and slow economic times. Consider what we've endured in the last five years: the collapse of the housing market, the financial crisis that followed, debt ceiling talks, the European debt crisis, and dramatic shifts in oil prices. All of this created the worst recession since the Great Depression, and brought consumer confidence to historic lows. With consumer spending making up 70 percent of the U.S. economy, we saw a spiral down across the economy. Businesses slowed hiring and unemployment rates rose dramatically, with millions of Americans out of work. The nation was in a panic. Four years later, we see growth in nearly every industry. Our August U.S. Employment Outlook revealed growth in job openings in 14 out of 18 industries over the last month, including the automotive, education, financial services, real estate, and technology sectors. It also showed that over the past year, we've even seen job openings increase in some of the nation's hardest hit industries, including construction and manufacturing. In addition, strong performing industries from recent past years, such as healthcare, continue to flourish with a consistent increase in job openings. Further, small businesses, which have historically been a key engine of our economy, have resumed hiring after a lull during the recessionary period. As employers continue to look at filling open positions and ramp their hiring efforts, our country's prospect of economic growth and recovery is bright -- albeit slow going. The U.S. economy is built upon businesses large and small, providing goods and services across a wide range of sectors. There are undeniable signs that we've seen the worst of the recent economic downturn, and that better times are ahead. If anything, our recovery from the Great Recession shows that our economy is as resilient as ever.

**Chinese middle class solves**

Chan 12 (Kam Wing, 6-23-12, University of Washington East Asia Forum, “Can China’s urbanisation save the world?,” http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/06/23/can-china-s-urbanisation-save-the-world/, accessed 7-5-12, AS).

In 2012 China’s urbanization became even more significant for the global economy, with Europe’s debt crisis and the US and Japan struggling to maintain growth leading many to regard Asia as the saviour of the world economy. Today the ‘China dream’ is more vivid than ever, with another 300–400 million people expected to relocate to China’s cities in the next 15 years. This urbanisation is presaged to cause a surge in Chinese consumers, and countries like Canada and Australia are increasingly betting their future on selling their commodities to China. Assertions about the huge potential of the Asian market are based on the assumption of a rapidly rising middle class, and have fuelled hopes for a global rebound. It is widely claimed that by 2030 Asia’s middle class will total 2.5–3 billion people, about 50 per cent more than the entire global middle class today.

**squo solves—forces political reform**

Cline 12 “Restoring Fiscal Equilibrium in the United States” William R. Cline (senior fellow, has been associated with the Peterson Institute for International Economics since its inception in 1981. His numerous publications include Financial Globalization, Economic Growth, and the Crisis of 2007–09 (2010) and The United States as a Debtor Nation (2005). He contributed to The Long-Term International Economic Position of the United States (2009).) Petersn Institute for International Economics: Policy Brief June 2012 http://www.mi.iie.com/publications/pb/pb12-15.pdf

‘Despite the year-end risks, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that **it is a good thing that the United States faces a fiscal tax rates and/or eliminate tax deductions so that the United States can restore federal revenue** to at least 18 percent of GDP and probably somewhat more in order to meet growing fiscal needs associated with an aging population. **The political pain of the higher tax rates should concentrate political minds on the associated task of finding more ways of cutting spending** and limiting increases in entitlement spending. It will nonetheless be important to phase in the fiscal adjustment gradually, for example, over the four years of the next presidential term, in order to moderate the output loss that would otherwise occur under current conditions of high unemployment combined with interest rates near zero. Moreover, the target for adjustment in the structural (noncyclical) fiscal balance should be 3 percent of GDP, and the component of overkill included in the fiscal cliff’s 5 percent of GDP adjustment should be avoided.

Manufacturing base is resilient – latest statistical studies

Schmidt, 12 - Associate Editor, Manufacturing Business Technology, cites Bradley J. Holcomb, CPSM, CPSD, chair of the Institute for Supply Management Manufacturing Business Survey Committee (Mike, “ISM: Manufacturing Is 'Resilient'” Wed, 06/13/2012, http://www.foodmanufacturing.com/articles/2012/06/ism-manufacturing-resilient)//ahayes

Resilient and strong are two of the best words to describe the current state of manufacturing in the United States, at least according to the May Manufacturing ISM Report On Business. Economic activity in the manufacturing sector expanded in May for the 34th consecutive month, and the overall economy grew for the 36th straight month. The report also indicated there is little to no reason to think anything will stand in the way of sustained growth during the second half of 2012. “I suspect we are going to see a continuation of this current trend over the next few months,” says Bradley J. Holcomb, CPSM, CPSD, chair of the Institute for Supply Management Manufacturing Business Survey Committee. The PMI registered 53.5 in May, down 1.3 percentage points when compared to April’s reading of 54.8 percent. A reading above 50 percent indicates the manufacturing economy is generally expanding, while a reading below 50 percent means it is generally contracting. “Overall I think it is a really solid report even though the PMI is down 1.3, it is still operating in a very nice range, as it has been all year,” says Holcomb, noting that the average PMI over the course of the past 12 months stands at 53.1. New Orders No index gives Holcomb more reason to expect future growth in manufacturing and the overall economy than this month’s ISM New Orders Index. It registered 60.1 percent in May, its highest reading since April of last year and an increase of 1.9 percentage points over April. “I’m pretty pleased with that number,” says Holcomb. “New orders drive this whole system. Order books seem to be strong across a broad array of industries, and that certainly bodes well for the next several months.” Prices One index that read quite different than it did a few short weeks ago is ISM’s Prices Index. It registered 47.5 percent in May, down 13.5 percentage points compared to the April reading of 61 percent. This is the first month the index reflected a decrease in the price of raw materials since December 2011, when it also registered 47.5 percent. The index hovered around 61 percent for the past three months prior to this month’s significant decrease, and it has approached nowhere near the heights it did in early-to-mid 2011. “Up until this month the Prices Index has been relatively moderate compared to last year,” says Holcomb. “I think last year we were in the 80s. Now we are in the 60s, which already signals moderating price increases. Now to see this fairly dramatic decrease is welcome good news.” What effect or effects will lower prices have on the manufacturing industry and economy as a whole? Holcomb has a few ideas. “It will indirectly have a fairly significant impact pretty broadly,” he says. “I think it will impact inventories. We’ll see inventories come up as they need to anyway, because (companies) will be able to get inventories at lower prices. They need inventories to fill those strong new orders, so it all works together.” Employment Another reason for future optimism is the steady, albeit slow, growth in the area of employment. ISM’s Employment Index registered 56.9 in May, down 0.4 percentage points from the 57.3 percent reported in April. It has been quite the consistent index over the course of the last several months, something Holcomb has liked to see. “Employment is holding pretty steady and pretty even at a good strong 56.9,” he says. “To the extent that stays up, that shows the confidence that manufacturing has and a continuation of new orders. That’s one to watch.” Production ISM’s Production Index registered 55.6 in May, down 5.4 percentage points when compared to the 61 percent reported in April. However, given the uptick in new orders, Holcomb doesn’t expect it to decrease further in 2012. “I think it’s going to be at or slightly above the current number,” says Holcomb. “If you look at the backlog, which impacts production, it is down a bit. This means there won’t be as much of a pull. But new orders more than overshadow that. I think that’s what we are going to see.” Overall, Holcomb states he is quite pleased with what he saw from this month’s report. “Manufacturing again has shown its resilience” he says. “I expect it to stay that way.”

**Alt Causes –**

**A) Qualified workers**

**GIT, 12** –Georgia Institute of Technology and the Council on Competitiveness, (“Report on the U.S. Manufacturing Competitiveness Initiative: Dialogue on Next Generation Supply Networks and Logistics” February 28 –29, 2012, http://www.isye.gatech.edu/news-events/special/usmci/N13C3008-ISyE-USManufacturingReport.pdf)//ahayes

Another of manufacturing’s challenges is a lack of qualified factory workers. This situation is, in part, a byproduct of public misconceptions that factory work is a dirty, low-paying, and dangerous job that is in short supply. This stigma has led a younger generation to pursue careers in other industries. However, the era of unskilled factory jobs is over. Today’s workers are highly skilled employees who operate complex equipment in safe, clean environments. The issue of resolving this situation of a deficit of workers carries added urgency because 2.7 million workers, or one-fourth of all U.S. white- and blue-collar manufacturing employees, are aged fifty-five and above. The aging workforce presents a knowledge gap as well because their tremendous store of experience will retire with them rather than be passed along to younger workers. A shortage of skilled talent in manufacturing is also beginning to be felt globally. Even China’s vast workforce will be adversely affected in the near future by an insufficient supply of engineering talent in that country.

**B) Taxes**

**GIT, 12** –Georgia Institute of Technology and the Council on Competitiveness, (“Report on the U.S. Manufacturing Competitiveness Initiative: Dialogue on Next Generation Supply Networks and Logistics” February 28 –29, 2012, http://www.isye.gatech.edu/news-events/special/usmci/N13C3008-ISyE-USManufacturingReport.pdf)//ahayes

Manufacturers also face an array of challenges that fall under the general heading of tax and regulatory policy. While everyone recognizes the need for taxes—and in many cases, everyone is willing to pay more for infrastructure improvements—the tax system generally does not provide incentives for critical expansion projects. The transportation industry faces an array of government policies covering everything from the permit process and route restrictions to environmental regulations and speed limitations. In an industry where time is money, burdensome regulations are costing too much of both. U.S. compliance and enforcement approaches create excessive costs, timing delays, and regulatory risks for U.S. infrastructure and manufacturing investments. Complex tax codes drive investment in high-cost overhead to develop and execute tax-minimization strategies and may create negative bias in planning decisions, causing many to conservatively evaluate investments based on statutory rather than lower effective rates. As businesses face mounting pressures to increase productivity and still deliver new lines of quality products, trying to forecast consumer spending is getting harder for suppliers throughout the industrial supply chain. Productivity will be only as good as our ability to reframe our supply approach by minimizing individual costs and system costs, decreasing cost to capacity assurance, integrating product ordering into transportation capacity, and rethinking the entire distribution paradigm. Finally, U.S. competitiveness suffers from the lack of a national industrial policy. All of the other major trading nations follow a blueprint of strategies, objectives, and benchmarks for coordinating and advancing their competitive positions in the world market. The U.S., by contrast, follows a short-term approach guided more by the two-year election cycle than by long-term, sustainable economic development that plans for ten or twenty

years down the road.

**Your authors aren’t qualified**

**Ikenson, 10** -Associate Director at the Center for Trade Policy Studies Cato Institute (Daniel J., “The Rumors of Manufacturing’s Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated” 9-10-10, http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/the-rumors-of-manufacturings-death-have-been-greatly-exaggerated/)//ahayes

“US manufacturing grows for 13th straight month” is the headline of an AP newswire story posted around noon today. This statistic doesn’t surprise me, since I’ve been following developments in U.S. manufacturing for many years now, and have published analyses of public data that refute the myth of deindustrialization and manufacturing decline. With the exception of the recession of 08-09, when all U.S. economic sectors took a hit, U.S. manufacturing has been breaking its own record, year after year, with respect to output, value-added, profits, returns on investment, exports, and imports. U.S. factories are the world’s most prolific, accounting for 21.4% of global manufacturing value added in 2008 (China accounted for 13.4%). But I bring the AP headline to your attention for one reason: so that you can judge for yourself who has any credibility on Capitol Hill, within the executive branch, in the media, among organized labor, in industry, in the think tank world, and within the international trade bar, as Nancy Pelosi tries to stuff a ruinous anti-China trade bill down our throats in the name of supporting our floundering manufacturing base. Look for the columns, the op-eds, the press releases, and the floor statements between next week and November. Who among them will continue to cite our suffering manufacturing sector as the justification for protectionism? They should never again have any credibility.

**12 percent of the plan goes into manufacturing.**

The Department of the Treasure and The Council of Economic Advisors 10 (October 21st, “AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT”, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/economic-policy/Documents/infrastructure\_investment\_report.pdf)//chm

Investing in transportation infrastructure creates middle class jobs. Our analysis suggests that 61 percent of the jobs directly created by investing in infrastructure would be in the construction sector, 12 percent would be in the manufacturing sector, and 7 percent would be in retail trade, for a total of 80 percent in these three sectors. Nearly 90 percent of the jobs in the three sectors most affected by infrastructure spending would be middle class jobs, defined as those paying between the 25 th and 75 th percentile of the national distribution of wages.

# 1nc BNB

This advantage is a description of the status quo – NADBANK finances now, a switch to infrastructure is not assumed in their evidence

**Bioterror risk exaggerated – It’s a conspiracy to justify funding for counter-measures.**

Leitenberg 05 (Milton, Senior research scholar at the U of Maryland and author of "Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat." LA Times – 2/17 lexis)

A pandemic flu outbreak of the kind the world witnessed in 1918-19 could kill hundreds of millions of people. The only lethal biological attack in the United States -- the anthrax mailings -- killed five. But the annual budget for combating bioterror is more than $7 billion, while Congress just passed a $3.8-billion emergency package to prepare for a flu outbreak. The exaggeration of the bioterror threat began more than a decade ago after the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo group released sarin gas in the Tokyo subways in 1995. The scaremongering has grown more acute since 9/11 and the mailing of anthrax-laced letters to Congress and media outlets in the fall of 2001. Now an edifice of institutes, programs and publicists with a vested interest in hyping the bioterror threat has grown, funded by the government and by foundations. Last year, for example, Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist described bioterrorism as "the greatest existential threat we have in the world today." But how could he justify such a claim? Is bioterrorism a greater existential threat than global climate change, global poverty levels, wars and conflicts, nuclear proliferation, ocean-quality deterioration, deforestation, desertification, depletion of freshwater aquifers or the balancing of population growth and food production? Is it likely to kill more people than the more mundane scourges of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, measles and cholera, which kill more than 11 million people each year? So what substantiates the alarm and the massive federal spending on bioterrorism? There are two main sources of bioterrorism threats: first, from countries developing bioweapons, and second, from terrorist groups that might buy, steal or manufacture them. The first threat is declining. U.S. intelligence estimates say the number of countries that conduct offensive bioweapons programs has fallen in the last 15 years from 13 to nine, as South Africa, Libya, Iraq and Cuba were dropped. There is no publicly available evidence that even the most hostile of the nine remaining countries -- Syria and Iran -- are ramping up their programs. And, despite the fear that a hostile nation could help terrorists get biological weapons, no country has ever done so -- even nations known to have trained terrorists.

**Bioterror is hyperbolized – threat con replicates impacts and creates serial policy failure**

**Ackerman and Moran 2006** (Gary A. And Kevin S., 2006, Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies, Bioterrorism and Threat Assessment,http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No22.pdf)

Public understanding of bioterrorism is frequently distorted by undue emphasis placed on worst case scenarios and highly dramatic – but relatively improbable – potential bio-attack outcomes. While such examples are sometimes important to “shock” broader communities into action, or to provide perspective on the extent of the risks posed by bioterrorism, unbalanced gravitation toward such extreme portrayals of the threat can: i) exacerbate the potential psychosocial impact of actual bioterrorism attacks; ii) strengthen terrorist interest in seeking such capabilities; and iii) subtly skew efforts to address bioterrorism, causing policy priorities to become misaligned with the most important and immediate needs. One especially good method for placing the threat of bioterrorism in perspective is grounding any discussion of the issue in the context of comparable public health issues, thereby clarifying the risks of bioterrorism relative to other natural biological risks that are more commonly accepted and understood.

Can’t solve underlying cause of bioterror – only the symptoms

**No US spill over or attacks - Cartels fear US retaliation to narco-terrorist attacks**

Kimery , 11 [Anthony L , 6-8-11 , Homeland Security Today , "Cartel Threats, Attacks On US Law Enforcement And The Question Of ‘Spill Over’ Violence" , http://www.hstoday.us/blogs/the-kimery-report/blog/cartel-threats-attacks-on-us-law-enforcement-and-the-question-of-spill-over-violence/19546dea1864ba1008378ba598069fa4.html , Accessed: 7-10-13, JC]

Former ICE Deputy Director Alonzo Pena, who retired late last year and is now border security technical director for ManTech, candidly told Homeland Security Today “I haven’t seen anything that would indicate to me that they [cartels] are any more frustrated out of desperation or anything” that would tell “to me” that the Gulf Cartel actually intends to begin firing on law enforcement officers on this side of the border.¶ ¶ Considered to have been a knowledgeable deputy ICE director with a clear-headed perspective on what’s happening on the southern border, Pena reasonably argued that the cartels “are all about profit, and that they’re not going to risk their livelihoods by provoking the wrath of US law enforcement,” which he said if they did, “would backfire on them one-hundred percent.”¶ ¶ There certainly has been an unprecedented US response south of the border to the cartel attack in February on two ICE agents that left one dead, and the apparent attempted assault on a DEA agent in Cuidad Juarez a week later that Homeland Security Today learned about.¶ ¶ Continuing, Pena said evidence indicates that the cartels’ desperation may not necessarily be so much a response to US counter-narco efforts as it is a response to the cartels having a much harder time recruiting people to work for them.¶ ¶ “They’re having to force people to work for them,” Pena stressed, asking: “What really has my curiosity raised” is, “why are they having to pull people from busses to work for them? This is much closer to what I see that’s happening rather than US law enforcement having an impact on their businesses.”¶ ¶ Pena told the Associated Press in February though that he believed “we're looking at an increase” in violence because the cartels “feel like they're cornered or they're threatened,” and that as a consequence, “they're going to react.”¶ ¶ Earlier that month, Pena told The Monitor, a south Texas newspaper, that “what we have seen is a … more violent Mexico in the last couple of years, and that “that, in combination with [the attack on ICE Special Agents Jaime Zapata and Victor Avila], will be a pivotal moment in the relationship with the US and Mexico to combat the organized crime groups.”¶ ¶ Top homeland security officials have steadfastly maintained - including at a congressional hearing in March - that there’s not yet been any quantifiable “spillover violence” north of the border.¶ ¶ Past and present senior DHS officials and other authorities pointed out that Mexican TCOs have repeatedly issued orders (openly and according to intelligence) over the years similar to the one reputedly made by the Gulf Cartel earlier this year that also stated that they would begin drawing down on American law enforcement officers who get in their way, but that none of these threats ever materialized.¶ ¶ Officials agreed with Pena that the cartels “aren’t stupid,” as one put it, and aren’t going to risk the wrath of the US government to wanton killings of US law enforcement officers on US soil.¶ ¶ As one southern border-assigned Border Patrol official put it: “I would think even the cartel[s] know how America would react to such attack[s]s. Even the liberals would want us to act.”¶ ¶ “I just don’t see any evidence of spill over violence,” said D. Rick Van Schoik, director of the North American Center for Transborder Studies at Arizona State University, who also noted that the cartels’ leaders “know not to poke the Bear; they know not to piss off the Americans.”

**No border terror – low threat, high security**

Powell 11– Houston Chronicle writer (Stewart M., “Are Potential Terrorists Crossing into Texas From Mexico?”, 12/2/11; < http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Are-potential-terrorists-crossing-into-Texas-from-2341185.php>)//Beddow

Pakistani officials told Texas' Republican Congressman Michael McCaul on a recent visit to Karachi that potential operatives from Pakistan, Iran, al-Qaida, the Taliban and the Haqqani network can obtain visas for Mexico from Mexican diplomatic outposts in Pakistan far more easily than getting them for the United States, making Mexico a perfect way station. Yet despite these dire possibilities - including Perry's contention that Hamas and Hezbollah are working in Mexico to come to the U.S. - experts say such Iranian-financed factions are not crossing the southwest border. They point instead to the 327 airports and border crossings in the United States where legitimate or forged passports might be used the same way that 19 hijackers gained access to carry out the 9/11 attacks. "The last thing these organizations want is to start out at the border with a high profile criminal act that gets attention," says James Carafano, a West Point graduate and retired Army lieutenant colonel handling security affairs at the Heritage Foundation. "They want to be as unobtrusive as possible." Federal law enforcement agents picked up 445,000 border crossers last year. But only 13 Iranians were taken into custody, a fraction of the 663 "special interest aliens" from 35 countries detained along the southwestern border for special U.S. scrutiny. None of the Iranians - indeed none of the 663 "special interest aliens" - has faced federal prosecution on terror-related charges, according to federal officials. No credible cases The number of Iranians apprehended by U.S. Border Patrol "has been historically minimal," said a Department of Homeland Security official. "**No credible terrorist threat has been identified, however DHS carefully monitors any potential threats along the Southwest border and responds accordingly."**

**No bioterror**

**a. dispersion fails**

**Smithson, Ph.D, ’05**

(E, project director for biological weapons at the Henry L. Stimson Center, “Likelihood of Terrorists Acquiring and Using Chemical or Biological Weapons”. <http://www.stimson.org/cbw/?SN=CB2001121259>)

Terrorists cannot count on just filling the delivery system with agent, pointing the device, and flipping the switch to activate it. Facets that must be deciphered include the concentration of agent in the delivery system, the ways in which the delivery system degrades the potency of the agent, and the right dosage to incapacitate or kill human or animal targets. For open-air delivery, the meteorological conditions must be taken into account. Biological agents have extreme sensitivity to sunlight, humidity, pollutants in the atmosphere, temperature, and even exposure to oxygen, all of which can kill the microbes.

Biological agents can be dispersed in either dry or wet forms. Using a dry agent can boost effectiveness because drying and milling the agent can make the particles very fine, a key factor since particles must range between 1 to 10 ten microns, ideally to 1 to 5, to be breathed into the lungs. Drying an agent, however, is done through a complex and challenging process that requires a sophistication of equipment and know-how that terrorist organizations are unlikely to possess. The alternative is to develop a wet slurry, which is much easier to produce but a great deal harder to disperse effectively. Wet slurries can clog sprayers and undergo mechanical stresses that can kill 95 percent or more of the microorganisms.

**b. no motive**

**Stolar 6** October 2006, \*Alex Stolar: Research Officer, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, “BIOTERRORISM AND US POLICY RESPONSES ASSESSING THE THREAT OF MASS CASUALTY,” http://www.ipcs.org/pdf\_file/issue/1659566521IPCS-Special-Report-31.pdf//NR

Each of these steps presents **significant hurdles for terrorists**. Acquiring a strain of a Category A agent which is significantly robust for storage, reproduction, transport, and dispersal, and which has the virulence to infect large numbers to **inflict mass casualties is very difficult**. Likewise, growing, storing, and transporting biological agents **requires substantial financial, logistical, and technological resources**, as well as highly trained scientists and technicians. Most of all, according to William Patrick of the US Army Biological Warfare Laboratories, **dissemination is the largest hurdle** for bioterrorism.4 Indeed, after devoting billions of dollars and years of research, dispersal is still a challenge before US and Russian biological weapons scientists. **It is unlikely**, at this stage, that terrorists will have the means, sophistication, logistics, or motivation to carry out a bioterrorist attack. Preparing biological agents for an attack is **very hard and costly**. Despite spending millions of dollars, and several years of work, the Aum Shinrikyo cult was unable to develop an effective biological weapon. Likewise, the 2001 Anthrax attacks in the United States involved very virulent Anthrax spores, but only five persons were killed. More sophisticated spores and dispersal methods would be required for a mass causalty attack. As Professor Milton Leitenberg notes, apart from the Rajneeshee cult attack in 1984, which sickened many, but killed none, “there is apparently no other ‘terrorist’ group that is known to have successfully cultured any pathogen.”5 Moreover, a lingering question is, why would terrorists use bioweapons in an attack? Executing a **biological weapon attack is difficult and expensive**, and does not suit the modus operandi of the sole group with the means to pursue bioterrorism, Al Qaeda. At present, Al Qaeda favors simple attacks that generate great fear. 9/11 was executed with box cutters; the Madrid train attacks with dynamite purchased from petty criminals6; the London 7/7 bombings utilized simple explosives that could be fashioned with easily available materials and little expertise7; and the terrorists in the recent plot to bomb flights from London to the US intended to use nail polish remover and hair bleach.8 Al Qaeda favors creating **great fear at little cost**. Why would it stray from this effective formula to bioterrorism which is expensive and of questionable reliability?9 The unavoidable conclusion is that only a nation-state could conduct a bioweapon attack. However, **a taboo against using biological weapons exists**—not since World War II has one state attacked another with biological weapons. Like non-state actors, states seem to prefer the lower costs and high reliability of conventional weapons or even chemical weapons. Accordingly, it seems **the threat of bioterrorism in the near future is low**. Neither terrorists nor states seem likely to use bioweapons for attack. Therefore, though possible, **it does not seem probable that a mass casualty bioterrorist attack will occur** over the next five to ten years. It is unlikely that states will use bioweapons against other states. It is equally unlikely that states will use a terrorist organization as a conduit to attack another state. Only terrorist organizations, operating alone within a weak or failed state, would develop bioweapons for an attack against a state. However, terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda presently lack the expertise, logistics, and equipment for a bioterror attack. In the next five years, it is unlikely that terrorists will acquire such capabilities. Beyond that time frame, what stands between terrorists and potent bioweapons are the policies of individual states and multilateral bioweapon non-proliferation regimes. If the policies of states and the relevant international regimes are robust, terrorists will be unable to mount bioterror attacks. If, on the other hand, these policies and regimes are feeble, or even counterproductive, the threat of bioterrorism will be real and grave. The present circumstances provide **great reason for optimism**. Unlike nuclear terrorism, **there is no imminent threat of biological terrorism**. Thoughtful and effective strategies implemented today can eliminate this threat. How often is this case true in international security? How often can strategists say, this threat could be dangerous in a decade, but is not dangerous now, and can be prevented forever if the right steps are taken? One would think that the world, and the US in particular, would seize this opportunity to prevent this future threat; unfortunately, however, America’s biodefense policies since 9/11 are hurting rather than helping efforts to minimize bioterrorism risks. Bioterrorism presents a grave, but not imminent threat to America and the world. American leadership is needed to make sure terrorists never acquire the ability to execute a mass casualty bioattack. Unfortunately, America’s biodefense strategies are currently increasing the risks of bioterrorism. In the years ahead, those American leaders responsible for protecting the US against bioterrorism should heed the maxim which has served so many doctors so well for so long: Primum non nocere.

**no water wars impact – empirically denied and coop solves**

Wolf and Jarvis 11 (Aaron and Todd, professor of geography and chair of the Department of Geosciences at Oregon State University and assistant professor of geography in the Department of Geosciences and the Associate Director of the Institute for Water and Watersheds at Oregon State University, 4/15/2011, Revolve, “Water Wars: Hydropotential or Hydrohype?,” <http://www.revolve-magazine.com/home/2011/04/15/water-wars/> JJ)

The history of international water treaties regarding surface water is robust. Over 400 treaties have been inventoried by the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database hosted by Oregon State University where we work. The earliest treaty dates back to 2500 BCE, following the only documented war over water in history, in Mesopotamia along the Tigris River.¶ Our students’ research on the history of cooperation over groundwater resources is much less robust, with only one treaty specifically addressing transboundary groundwater; only a small percentage of the international water treaties have any provisions for groundwater.¶ Our research at Oregon State University on conflict “events” described in newspapers and other media over the last fifty years reveals that countries have engaged in more than 500 conflicts over water, far outweighed by more than 1200 cooperative events.¶ Peter Gleick of the US water think tank, the Pacific Institute, mapped the conflicts and showed that every continent has experienced a water conflict, save Antarctica.¶ Violent conflict has occurred at sub-national levels, but there has been no international violent conflict over transboundary waters since the mid-1960s.¶ Almost 90 per cent of the events were disagreements over infrastructure and quantity allocation. Yet colleagues Zeitoun and Miramachi indicate that “all is not quiet on the waterfront. Conflicts of distribution, co-management, and utilization persist, of course, along the Nile, Mekong, Tigris, Jordan, Indus, Ganges, Amu Darya and several other transboundary rivers and aquifers” and that “not all cooperation over water is pretty and more times than not conflict and cooperation co-exist.”¶ What causes the tension over water? In a global review of local conflict and water, the Stockholm International Water Institute determined that the root causes of water-related conflicts included limited resources, control or distribution, quality of the resource, and large infrastructure projects.¶ Conflict resolution specialist Lawrence Susskind at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology writes in his blog The Consensus Building Approach that “there are societal forces (politics, economics and culture) and natural forces (water quantity, water quality and ecosystems) all of which have to be managed at the same time [...] and that these six elements and the way they are configured must be looked upon as interlocking networks”.¶ He posits that there are three things about these networks that many water-system managers get wrong:¶ (1) assuming these networks can be bounded or closed – agreements or laws are formulated that prescribe who the users are, which elements will be included and excluded and what the boundaries will be when the fact of the matter is that new users and uses may appear at any time including, but not limited to, ecological and economic forces;¶ (2) water-system managers try to set operating rules aimed at managing a river segment in a way that makes sense on an average day, in an average year or when the system is at a stable or steady state despite all kinds of climatic, economic and demographic pushes and pulls; and¶ (3) most water-system managers act as if water is a limited resource and that decisions about who gets water and how it may be used are zero-sum decisions.¶ Colleagues Shira Yoffe and Mark Giordano assisted in the Basins at Risk project completed at Oregon State University. The research found that determined most of the parameters regularly identified as indicators of water conflict, such as water scarcity and climate change, are actually only weakly linked to disputes. Institutional capacity within a basin, whether defined as water management bodies or treaties, or generally positive international relations are as important, if not more so, than the physical aspects of a system.¶ It turns out then that very rapid changes, either on the institutional side or in the physical system, which outpace the institutional capacity to absorb that change, are at the root of most water conflicts. In related work, popular water author Sandra Postel and Wolf determined that corruption in transboundary water can cause international conflict, destabilize entire regions and lead to ecological disaster.

**no link between water scarcity and political tension**

Wolf 99 [Aaron T., Ph.D., works in the Department of GeosciencesOregon State University, “Water and Human Security”, Universities Council on Water Resources, http://ucowr.siu.edu/updates/pdf/V118\_A5.pdf]

An increasingly prevalent viewpoint about water and security is best summed up by Ismail Serageldin, vice-president of the World Bank: “The wars of the next century will be about water” (quoted in the New York Times 10 August 1995**). The view that water will lead to acute international conflict**, one that is often tied to causal arguments of environmental security, **unfortunately is gaining ground** in both academic and popular literature. **Some authors assume a natural link between water scarcity and acute conflict, suggesting that “competition for limited . . . freshwater . . . leads to severe political tensions and even to war”** (Westing 1986). Others, often citing examples from the arid and hostile Middle East, assume that “history is replete with examples of violent conflict over water” (Butts 1997). Still others, combining this “natural” connection between water and conflict with assumed historic evidence, forecast: “The renewable resource most likely to stimulate interstate resource war is river water” (Homer-Dixon 1994). **There are two major problems with the literature that describes water both as a historic and, by extrapolation, as a future cause of acute international conflict:** 1.There is little historic evidence that water has ever been the cause of international warfare; and 2. War over water seems neither strategically rational, hydrographically effective, nor economically viable. One component of the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database Project2 at Oregon State University has been an assessment of historic cases of international water conflicts. In order to counter the prevailing anecdotal approach, **researchers** associated with the project utilized the most systematic collection of international conflict – Brecher and Wilkenfeld’s (1997) International Crisis Behavior data set – and supplemented their investigation with available primary and secondary sources. This search **revealed a total of seven cases in which armies were mobilized or shots were fired across international boundaries – in every case, the dispute did not degrade into warfare.3 According to our findings, with one exception (now almost 4,500 years old),4 there has not been a war fought over water.** It is, however, disingenuous to base a discussion about the future solely on history. Part of the basis for predictions of future “water wars,” after all, is that we are reaching unprecedented demand on relatively decreasingclean water supplies. But there are other arguments against the possibility of “water wars.”5They might include: A Strategic Argument If one were to launch a war over water, what would be the goal? **Presumably, the aggressor would have to be both downstream and the regional hegemony – an upstream riparian nation would have no cause to launch an attack and a weaker nation would be foolhardy to do so. An upstream riparian nation, then, would have to initiate an action, which decreases either quantity or quality, knowing that doing so will antagonize a stronger down-stream neighbor. The down-stream power would then have to decide whether to launch an attack – if the project were a dam, destroying it would result in a wall of water rushing back on down-stream territory. Were it a quality-related project, either industrial or waste treatment, destroying it would probably result in even worse quality than before. Furthermore, the hegemony would have to weigh not only an invasion, but an occupation and depopulation of the entire watershed in order to forestall any retribution – otherwise, it would be simple to pollute the water source of the invading power**. It is unlikely that both countries would be democracies, since the political scientists tell us that democracies do not go to war against each other, and the international community would have to refuse to become involved (this, of course, is the least far-fetched aspect of the scenario). All of this effort would be expended for a resource that costs about one U.S. dollar per cubic meter to create from seawater.

**Scarcity sparks cooperation.**

Wolf 99 [Aaron T., Ph.D., works in the Department of GeosciencesOregon State University, “Water and Human Security”, Universities Council on Water Resources, http://ucowr.siu.edu/updates/pdf/V118\_A5.pdf]

A Shared Interest Argument <What is it about **wate**r that **tends to induce cooperation even among riparian nations that are hostile over other issue**s? The **treaties negotiated over international waterways** offer some insight into this question. Each treaty **show**s sometimes exquisite sensitivity to the unique setting and needs of each basin, and many detail **the shared interests a common waterway will bring**. Along larger waterways, for instance, the better dam sites are usually upstream at the headwaters where valley walls are steeper and where, incidentally, the environmental impact of dams is not as great. The prime agricultural land is generally downstream, where the gradient drops off and alluvial deposits enrich the soil. A dam in the headwaters, then, not only provides hydropower and other benefits for the upstream riparian nation, it also can be managed to evenly control the flow for the benefit of downstream agriculture, or to enhance water transportation for the benefit of both riparian nations. Other examples of shared interests abound: the development of a river that acts as a boundary cannot take place without cooperation; farmers, environmentalists, and recreational users all share an interest in seeing a healthy stream-system; and all riparian nations share an interest in high quality water. An Institutional Resiliency Argument Another factor adding to the political stability of international watersheds is that once **cooperative water regimes are established**, they **turn out to be tremendously resilient over time, even** between otherwise hostile riparian nations, and even **as conflict is waged over other issues**. For example, the Mekong Committee has functioned since 1957, exchanging data throughout the Vietnam War. Secret “picnic table” talks have been held between Israel and Jordan, since the unsuccessful Johnston negotiations of 1953-55, even as these riparian nations were in a legal state of war until recently. And, the Indus River Commission not only survived through two wars between India and Pakistan, but treaty-related payments continued unabated throughout the hostilities. Any of these arguments, in and of itself, might not convince one of the unlikelihood of “water wars.” **The combination of all of these factors, though – a historic lack of evidence combined with strategic, interest-based, and institutional irrationality of acute international hydro- conflicts – should help convince us to think of water as a vehicle for reducing tensions and encouraging cooperation even between otherwise hostile co-riparian nations.** Undala **Alam** (1998) **has aptly dubbed this concept of water as a resource that transcends traditional thinking about resource-related disputes**, “water rationality.”>

**Mexico’s economy is resilient**

**a. effective crisis management**

**IMF 12** (International Monetary Fund, “Mexico Banks Resilient, But Global Risks Need Care”, 3/30/12, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2012/car033012a.htm)//WL

Mexico’s banking system is resilient and well capitalized, and stress tests indicate that it would be capable of sustaining significant shocks, the IMF said in its latest assessment of the country’s financial system. However, Mexico, the current president of the Group of Twenty (G-20) advanced and emerging economies, will need to be vigilant to risks from outside the country and should strengthen the institutional framework for its supervision of financial regulation by establishing a fixed term for the President of the Banking Commission, rebalancing its Board and promoting stronger legal safeguards for its personnel, the IMF said. “Our assessment of Mexico’s financial system is very positive,” said Fernando Montes-Negret, a senior financial expert in the IMF’s Monetary and Capital Markets Department and head of the team that conducted the assessment. Cross-border linkages“ The country has better tools for systemic crisis management and competent supervision. However, there have been episodes of distress in recent years and given Mexico’s significant linkages to the global economy and to Spanish banks, authorities need to monitor closely and respond quickly to emerging risks,” Montes-Negret said. The assessment was published on March 30.In the wake of the global economic crisis, the IMF has strengthened its surveillance of countries’ financial systems. Since 1999, the IMF has monitored countries’ financial sectors on a voluntary basis through a joint review process with the World Bank called the Financial Sector Assessment Program. Mexico is one of the major 25 financial sectors that must undergo a review of its financial health as part of the IMF’s economic surveillance and monitoring. The global economic crisis laid bare the devastating economic consequences a financial crisis in one country can have on the global economy. Countries with financial sectors that have the greatest impact on global financial stability are now required to undergo in-depth reviews of their financial health by the IMF every five years. In its assessment of the health of Mexico’s financial system, the IMF recommended the government enact a series of reforms as Latin America’s second largest economy continues to modernize.

**b. growth will continue**

**Hall 1/24** - Vice-President and Chief Economist at Export Development Canada (Peter G, “Mexico's Resilience”, Export Development Canada, 1/24/13, http://embamex.sre.gob.mx/canada\_eng/images/pdfs/mexico\_resilience.pdf)//WL

Mexico's Resilience Few economies escaped the global slowdown in the summer of 2012. Mexico was a rare and notable exception. While marked deterioration in China, India and Brazil grabbed the headlines, Mexico quietly hummed along, generating remarkably smooth growth. For an economy so tied to US fortunes, that is quite an achievement. What is the secret of Mexico's success? GDP statistics tell the tale. India's growth plunged from 8 per cent in mid-2011 to just under 3 per cent last summer. Brazil's long slide saw year-to-year increases tumble from 8 per cent in mid 2010 to less than half of one percent in the second quarter of 2012. China's slowdown was less dramatic, sliding from 9 per cent at the end of 2011 to 7.4 per cent by mid-2012 - but given that China's economy experiences serious dislocation at around 6 per cent growth, its dip was too close for comfort. Thankfully, the worst seems to be over, and these economies are now on the mend. At the same time, Mexico steadily generated quarterly growth in the 3.5-to-5 per cent range, with no discernible down-trend. True, the latest GDP figure is the weakest showing since the recession in 2009, but over the course of a year, growth fell by a mere 1 per cent, to a still-healthy 3.3 per cent. Among major emerging markets, only Russia showed similar resilience - but in terms of net steadiness, Mexico still comes out on top. How do the numbers add up? Delving into Mexico's national accounts is revealing. Consumers were surprisingly resilient in the post-recession period, but they are currently less enthusiastic; growth recently receded from the steady 4 per cent pace to just 2.2 per cent in the third quarter of 2012. Private investment saw an even steeper decline. From an impressive 8-10 per cent pace, private construction registered a stunning 20 per cent year-on-year gain at the end of 2011 - only to see growth completely vanish by the summer of 2012. Similarly, private sector machinery and equipment investment - accustomed to hefty double-digit increases - sunk to a year-on-year gain just shy of 4 per cent early last fall. So far, the Mexican economy doesn't seem much different from the rest of the world. What is keeping its overall numbers afloat? Throughout 2012, the growing private investment void was filled in by a surge of public investment - mostly construction projects. On paper it seems too good to be true, but the government's intervention couldn't have been better timed and the amounts could hardly have been better calibrated. In the history of fiscal timing, it's probably one for the record books. But the story doesn't end there. Notwithstanding the very recent lull, rising private investment speaks to Mexico's ongoing success at attracting large amounts of foreign investment. Production arising from these investments is boosting Mexico's exports, which over the past two years have outpaced import growth, yielding a decent net contribution to the economy. That's something the other large emerging markets were not been able to say until very recently, and highlights the underlying strength of the US economy, the main driver of Mexico's export success. Will Mexico's enviable record continue? The keen interest of foreign investors in Mexico suggests that the slowdown of private investment is temporary - good news for the government, which can't afford to offset private investment indefinitely. More importantly, the export potential that justifies foreign investments is strong, thanks to resurgent US housing, consumer and corporate markets. **T**he bottom line? Mexico's recent growth run is impressive, and is set to continue. Over the coming months, this market will be one to watch.

 **NADBank fails - Renovation would cost $6 billion- NADBank doesn’t have that much in funds**

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http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/State\_of\_Border\_Trade\_Economy\_0.pdf [Accessed 7/8/13], JB).

Port of Entry Infrastructure One of the most obvious and often cited way s to reduce congestion at the POEs is to update and expand border crossing infrastructure, and credit is certainly due to U.S. government and border communities for significant recent advance s. After a decade with no new ports of entry built, three new crossings were opened in 2010: Anzalduas, San Luís II, and Donna - Rio Bravo. 13 In 2011, seven new lanes were opened on the World Trade Bridge, the most important crossing point for commercial traf fic between the United States and Mexico. Significant expansions are also underway at San Ysidro, the most trafficked crossing for individuals, and at Nogales - Mariposa. Despite these important advances, much work remains to be done. Average U.S. land POEs are more than forty years old, with some over seventy years old. 14 Customs and Border Protection believes that “federal appropriations have not kept pace with needs,” noting $6 billion dollars of investment are needed to “fully modernize” the land ports of entry along the United States southern and northern borders.

 **NADBank only has $2.3 billion**

NADBank 2011

(“ANNUAL REPORT: NADBank.” http://www.nadbank.org/pdfs/publications/2011AnnualReport.pdf, JB)

FUNDING RESOURCES Capitalization The total authorized capital of NADB is US$3 billion with equal commitments from its two member countries, the United States and Mexico. Each government authorized the subscription of 150,000 shares of the Bank’s capital stock with a par value of US$10,000 per share. Fifteen percent of NADB’s authorized capital is in the form of paid-in capital, with the remaining eighty-five percent is callable capital. Paid-in capital consists of cash funds contributed to NADB by the two governments. As of May 2009, the Bank had received all paid-in capital contributions from the U.S. and Mexico, totaling US$450 million. As set forth in its Charter at inception, 10% of the paid-in capital and associated callable capital subscribed by each country went to finance the domestic programs. Therefore, of the US$450 million in paid-in capital, US$45 million was transferred to the domestic programs for community adjustment and investment, leaving US$405 million for NADB's international program. The paid-in capital for the domestic programs was divided equally between the two countries with each receiving US$22.50 million for its respective program. The balance of paid-in capital and related earnings for the Mexican domestic program was subsequently transferred to the Mexican federal government as of June 1999. In the case of the U.S. domestic program, NADB continues to hold and administer the balance of its paid-in capital and related earnings. As of December 31, 2011, US$8.11 million in paid-in capital was allocated to USCAIP and held in the Bank’s General Reserve. Callable capital totaling US$2.55 billion—with US$250 million related to the domestic programs and the remaining US$2.30 billion to the international program—is composed of funds that must be provided to NADB by the two governments if required to meet its outstanding debt obligations or guaranties. Callable capital may not be used for loans or investments and constitutes, in effect, backing for the Bank’s outstanding indebtedness and guaranties. Any capital call must be made uniformly to both member countries, but the obligations of the U.S. and Mexico to make payment of the callable portion of their capital subscriptions to the Bank are independent of each other. As a result, the failure of one member country to make payment on any such call would not excuse the other member from its obligation to make payment and, if necessary, the Bank may make successive calls on the non- defaulting member, up to its subscribed callable capital limit. Neither member country may be required to pay more than the unpaid balance of its capital subscription. The United States’ subscription of US$1.275 billion of callable capital stock has been authorized by the U.S. Congress but not yet appropriated. Further action by Congress would be required to enable the Secretary of the U.S. Treasury to pay any portion of this amount. Similarly, Mexico’s subscription of US$1.275 billion of callable capital stock has been fully authorized by its legislature, but payment upon a call would be subject to an allocation of Mexican budgetary resources for such purposes.

**Mexico says no – border disputes**

Rueda, 13 [Manuel, June 26, 2013, “Mexico Slams U.S. Border Buildup Plan”, http://abcnews.go.com/ABC\_Univision/News/mexico-slams-us-immigration-reform-bills-proposed-border/story?id=19495974, accessed 7-10-13 BLE]

"We have things we can shut down, too," said Meyer, who suggested that in retaliation, the Mexican government could make it harder for U.S companies to invest in the country, or cancel laws that enable U.S. citizens to buy property in Mexico. Meyer said that while those measures might have a small impact, they could "send a signal" to the U.S. government about Mexico's displeasure with the border fence. Sergio Aguayo, a lawyer and human rights activist, had a more moderate suggestion. He said the Mexican government should seriously lobby the U.S. congress and American society in general for policies that better suit the country's interests, just as Israel currently does through a robust lobbying presence in Washington. Aguayo said that when it comes to lobbying, Mexico has an advantage that Israel did not have: More than 30 million Mexican-Americans who already live in the U.S. and make up 10 percent of the country's population. That segment of the population, he added, tends to sympathize with Mexico's interests.

**The totalizing us-them nature of terrorism discourse prevents effective measures to stop the violence, requiring an infinite mimetic war to “win” – our alternative is to reject their linguistic framing of terrorism and problematize the totalizing perspective.**

**Zulaika 03** Joseba Zulaika, (Professor, Center for Basque Studies), Radical History Review, Issue 85 (winter 2003), ebsco

The events of September 11 are not immune to the possibility that counterterrorism is complicit in creating the very thing it abominates. We mentioned earlier that Sheik Omar, condemned to a New York prison for the rest of his life as the mastermind of the 1993 attack on the WTC, was directly a product of the CIA that recruited him for Reagan’s anti-Soviet crusade in Afghanistan and gave him visas to come to the United States. The same pattern fits Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. The United States initially trained and armed them. When the Taliban became a pariah regime, the United States’ main ally in the Arab world, Saudi Arabia, gave them primary support. But the blame game leads us at once into what Slavoj Zˇizˇek has labeled “the temptation of a double blackmail.”21 Namely, either the unconditional condemnation of Third World evil that appears to endorse the ideological position of American innocence, or drawing attention to the deeper sociopolitical causes of Arab extremism, which ends up blaming the victim. Each of the two positions prove one-sided and false. Pointing to the limits of moral reasoning, Zˇ izˇ ek resorts to the dialectical category of totality to argue that “from the moral standpoint, the victims are innocent, the act was an abominable crime; however, this very innocence is not innocent—to adopt such an ‘innocent’ position in today’s global capitalist universe is in itself a false abstraction.”22 This does not entail a compromised notion of shared guilt by terrorists and victims; “the point is, rather, that the two sides are not really opposed, that they belong to the same field. In short, the position to adopt is to accept the necessity of the fight against terrorism, BUT to redefine and expand its terms so that it will include also (some) American and other Western powers’ acts.”23 As widely reported at the time, the Reagan administration, led by Alexander Haig, would self-servingly “confuse terrorism with communism.”24 As the cold war was coming to an end, terrorism became the easy substitute for communism in Reagan’s black-and-white world. Still, when Haig would voice his belief that Moscow controlled the worldwide terrorist network, the State Department’s bureau of intelligence chief Ronald Spiers would react by thinking that “he was kidding.”25 By the 1990s, the Soviet Union no longer constituted the terrorist enemy and only days after the Oklahoma City bombing, Russian president Yeltsin hosted President Clinton in Moscow who equated the recent massacres in Chechnya with Oklahoma City as domestic conflicts. We should be concerned as to what this new Good-versus-Evil war on terror substitutes for. Its consequences in legitimizing the repression of minorities in India, Russia, Turkey, and other countries are all too obvious. But the ultimate catastrophe is that such a categorically ill-defined, perpetually deferred, simpleminded Good-versus-Evil war echoes and re-creates the very absolutist mentality and exceptionalist tactics of the insurgent terrorists. By formally adopting the terrorists’ own game—one that by definition lacks rules of engagement, definite endings, clear alignments between enemies and friends, or formal arrangements of any sort, military, political, legal, or ethical—the inevitable danger lies in reproducing it endlessly. One only has to look at the Palestinian-Israeli or the Basque-Spanish conflicts to see how self-defeating the alleged “victories” against terrorism can be in the absence of addressing the causes of the violence. “A war against terrorism, then, mirrors the state of exception characteristic of insurgent violence, and in so doing it reproduces it ad infinitum. The question remains: What politics might be involved in this state of alert as normal state? Would this possible scenario of competing (and mutually constituting) terror signify the end of politics as we know it?”27 It is either politics or once again the self-fulfilling prophecy of fundamentalist crusaders who will never be able to entirely eradicate evil from the world. Our choice cannot be between Bush and bin Laden, nor is our struggle one of “us” versus “them.” Such a split leads us into the ethical catastrophe of not feeling full solidarity with the victims of either side—since the value of each life is absolute, “the only appropriate stance is the unconditional solidarity with ALL victims.” 28We must question our own involvement with the phantasmatic reality of terrorism discourse, for “now even the USA and its citizens can be regulated by terrorist discourse. . . . Now the North American territory has become the most global and central place in the new history that terrorist ideology inaugurates.”29 Resisting the temptation of innocence regarding the barbarian other implies an awareness of a point Hegel made and that applies to the contemporary and increasingly globalized world more than ever: evil, he claims, resides also in the innocent gaze itself, perceiving as it does evil all around itself. Derrida equally holds this position. In reference to the events of September 11, he said: “My unconditional compassion, addressed to the victims of September 11, does not prevent me from saying it loudly: with regard to this crime, I do not believe that anyone is politically guiltless.”30 In brief, we are all included in the picture, and these tragic events must make us problematize our own innocence while questioning our own political and libidinal investment in the global terrorism discourse.